Ethyca vs Privado AI: how they compare in 2026

Remove the models and a data governance platform remains, which is the B band. Fides is an ontology and policy language, Janus is consent and preference management, Lethe is policy-based data rights fulfilment and de-identification, and the data inventory can be populated from existing DSPM tools and catalogues: none of that requires a model. The models are the engine of two core capabilities. Helios classifies discovered data with a large language model applied to database metadata, and Astralis performs continuous agentic risk assessment and enforces purpose-based access at runtime, including rewriting an agent's query where the inferred purpose is not permitted. The vendor's own positioning is a governance harness for AI rather than a product that is itself a model. Verified 12 September 2026.

The model is the engine of a core capability, layered on a product the vendor itself sells without it. Wren is a named AI agent that runs the privacy assessment cycle: monitoring internal tools for reviewable activity, triaging against the customer's playbook, researching the question, reading imported documentation, contracts, interview transcripts, code and connected applications, generating evidence and populating the assessment, then routing it to approvers. That is model work at the centre of the assessment product. The reason this is not the top grade is the vendor's own statement: the pricing page confirms the platform includes a base assessment module that can be purchased without Wren, and the web auditor, app auditor and code scanning modules are separately priced products whose mechanisms are live scanning, static analysis and simulated consent journeys rather than models. So a substantial and separately saleable part of what Privado sells does not depend on a model at all. Wren product page, pricing page and Annexure A of the subscription terms read 7 September 2026.

The strongest published accuracy evidence located in this corpus, and the A rests on the limbs that bite. A first-party engineering account dated 23 December 2025 and attributed to a named author publishes precision, recall and F1 for the Helios classifier, improving from roughly 50% at baseline to over 80% against an adversarial benchmark suite and over 95% against benchmarks drawn from real-world systems, with validation against customer-provided datasets reported at over 90% and a comparison showing positive AI labels wrong 5% of the time against 14% for human labels. The test set is described: around 2,000 tagging tasks across 43 data categories, benchmark examples for 46 categories, fully synthetic schemas generated without reference to customer data, and the ground-truth labelling method including the disagreement-review pass that grew the labelled set from 449 to 825 fields. Three failure modes are named and diagnosed with the fix for each: laziness, shallowness and credulity. The vendor also publishes a critique of naive accuracy metrics, showing that a classifier which does nothing scores 98.6% on a typical enterprise distribution, which is the opposite of the bare claim the D band was written for. R15 governs two limbs that do not apply to the product class: the product cites no legal authority, so grounding to primary authority and citator status are neither credited nor penalised. What the A does not rest on: no accuracy figure appears on any product page, only in the engineering post, and the category-by-category breakdown is shown in screenshots rather than in text. Verified 12 September 2026.

Grounding is real and the retrieval path is described, short of any measurement. The vendor states which sources Wren reads to populate an assessment, naming them individually: imported documentation such as product requirement documents, technical specifications, support documents, interview transcripts and notes; contracts, from which data processing terms are extracted; source code through a source control integration; connected SaaS applications through API integrations; and internet research, with a cookie agent described as verifying cookie categorisation by researching the internet in real time. The output carries evidence excerpts back to the material they came from, and gaps Wren could not fill are surfaced rather than filled in. What is absent is measurement of any kind: no accuracy rate for populated assessments, no evaluation, no test set, no error analysis, and no statement of how often an evidence excerpt supports the conclusion drawn from it. Several limbs of this band do not bite and are named rather than penalised, since the outputs are assessments and data maps rather than legal assertions citing authority. Wren product page and pricing FAQ read 7 September 2026.

Real review surfaces and a described control structure, short of the limb the B band names as commonly absent. What the system does alone is published plainly: Astralis checks every agent call through an MCP gateway before it runs, rewrites a query whose inferred purpose is not permitted, re-evaluates the risk register nightly, and drafts assessments and mitigations for approval. What constrains it is customer-defined: a purposes taxonomy, policy definitions, and the Fides ontology the customer versions itself. Review surfaces are the risk register, the assessment report and the audit record of how and why each access decision was made. What is not published is the threshold structure: where the gateway blocks rather than rewrites, what happens when an enforcement decision is wrong, and whether a human approves a mitigation before it is applied. The classifier post's human-in-the-loop discussion concerns Ethyca's own evaluation work rather than the customer's oversight of the shipped product, and is not credited here. Verified 12 September 2026.

A real division of labour is published with genuine review surfaces, short of the threshold that would settle where the boundary sits. What is published: Wren triages incoming activity and triggers the appropriate assessment or record of processing based on the risk value and the playbook and privacy policies defined by the customer's team, which makes the constraint the buyer's own document rather than a vendor default; assessments are routed to approvers; gaps Wren cannot fill are surfaced for a person to answer in chat; and risks it identifies are tracked alongside those raised by privacy stakeholders. That is a workflow with a person in it at named points. What is missing is the limb this band names as commonly absent. The vendor states that Wren eliminates manual threshold assessments and immediately communicates privacy guidance for low-risk activity, so it does answer some questions without review, and nothing published defines what counts as low risk, what Wren may finalise unattended, or what happens when an assessment it populated is wrong and a decision has already been taken on it. Wren product page and pricing FAQ read 7 September 2026.

Named customers and published figures, never joined, which is the B band exactly. Sixteen customers are named on the customers page, each with its own profile page, including The New York Times, Ramp, SurveyMonkey, WeTransfer, Vercel, Lush, Zola, Casper and American City Business Journals. Platform figures are specific: 744m preferences processed annually, more than 4m access requests processed, 200+ global brands, $74m+ saved by automation, subject request fulfilment from 15 hours to 17.2 seconds, 1 PB governed daily, 150,000 policy decisions enforced per second. None is attributed to a named customer and no method is stated for any of them. The New York Times profile page was opened and carries the customer's own business metrics (11.7m subscribers, $2.59bn revenue, 139 Pulitzer Prizes) and a chief executive quote about the newspaper's subscription strategy rather than about the product: on that page alone the evidence is the C shape. The breadth of named customers and the specificity of the platform figures carry the row to B. Fifteen further customer pages were not opened. Verified 12 September 2026.

Named customers with named people in named roles, and no figures. Three deployments are published with attributed quotations and linked case studies: HP, where a Privacy Innovation and Assurance Leader describes visibility of personal data across the technology stack and automation of manual controls such as privacy reviews; HERE Technologies, where a Director and Head of Product Trust says compliance reports match data flows as the product evolves; and Headspace Health, where a chief information security officer describes building privacy into the software development lifecycle to prevent accidental sharing or tracking. Those are real deployment statements from identifiable people rather than logos. What is absent is the quantified half: no figure for review time, assessment volume, issues found or cost, no dates on the deployments, and no method behind any claim. The customers page carrying the full case studies was not read this pass and is the route to a higher grade. Wren product page read 7 September 2026.

Substantive contractual commitments readable before signing, and the A band's privilege limb is absent, which R33 makes decisive. Published and read in full: MSA section 4.1 licenses Customer Data only to provide the Service and fulfil Ethyca's obligations, with a separate narrow licence over Audit Data, defined as three enumerated fields, for legal compliance alone; section 4.2 commits to using Customer Data solely for legitimate operational needs such as audit trail creation and system monitoring, or where required by law; section 9 is a mutual confidentiality regime with need-to-know limits and written obligations on personnel; DPA section 3(f) commits to deletion or return within 90 days of termination; the CCPA schedule bars retention, use or disclosure for any purpose beyond the business purpose and bars sale. The design fact that answers the model-provider question in this product's own idiom is that the classifier is metadata-only and, in the vendor's words, requires no access to sensitive data. Two limbs keep this at B: nothing located addresses privilege or work product treatment, and no third-party model provider's retention position is stated anywhere, the inference platform being unnamed. MSA last modified 10 February 2023; DPA 17 October 2024. Verified 12 September 2026.

Substantive published commitments, unusually well enforced, short of segregation and of the model provider question. The subscription terms make Customer Content, including source code and data elements and the reports generated from them, the customer's Confidential Information, and put the ordinary five-year confidentiality survival aside for exactly that material so the obligation runs until an exception applies rather than expiring. Use is confined by a limited-term licence to host, copy, transmit, analyse, process, store and configure Customer Content solely as necessary to provide the services, with all intellectual property in the generated reports vesting in the customer. Enforcement is real rather than nominal: a contractual penalty of twelve months' fees for any breach of the confidentiality obligation, which does not release Privado from performance and does not displace the customer's damages claim, and a liability cap that is lifted entirely for confidentiality and privacy breaches. The security page adds role-based access control and a stated internal procedure preventing employee or administrator access to user data except for limited support exceptions, with staff under confidentiality agreements. Two limbs are missing: nothing addresses segregation between customers or between matters inside a tenant, and nothing states what the model providers behind Wren may retain, since none is named. Subscription terms and security page read 7 September 2026.

A real published position on advice versus tooling, in the instrument that governs the product and unusually plain. MSA section 10.4 is headed No Legal or Regulatory Advice and states that Ethyca is not providing legal, accounting, tax or regulatory services, is not advising on compliance with or interpretation of any privacy or security law, that any recommendation it gives concerns the functionality of the Service only and is given from a business perspective, that the customer should not rely on it as legal advice, and that the customer retains sole responsibility for identifying and complying with its own obligations. Section 10.3 goes further than most: the vendor expressly does not warrant that use of the Service will result in compliance with applicable laws, which is the claim a governance product is most tempted to make. Who may use it is stated as Authorized Users under an Order Form for internal business purposes. Short of the full band: nothing addresses a supervising lawyer's competence or supervision duties, and no jurisdiction limit is placed on the guidance the product emits. R15 applies to the consumer-facing limb, which does not bite on an enterprise platform with no public advice surface. Verified 12 September 2026.

A disclaimer sits in the terms while the product issues guidance, and nothing addresses where the output stops and a legal judgement begins. The live question here is sharper than in most records on this axis: the vendor states that Wren eliminates manual threshold assessments and immediately communicates privacy guidance for low-risk activity, which means a model is telling a business stakeholder that an activity does not need a data protection impact assessment. Nothing published says that such guidance is not legal advice, that the privacy counsel or data protection officer remains responsible for the determination, or what happens if the threshold call was wrong. What exists in the agreement is adjacent rather than on point: section 5 records the customer's acknowledgement that it relied on its own skill and judgment to check the applicability of the software and to validate suitability for its intended use, and section 9 disclaims fitness for a particular purpose. Those are suitability and warranty provisions, not a statement about the advice line. Same grade and reasoning as the comparable records in this lane. Subscription terms, Wren page and pricing FAQ read 7 September 2026.

A published testing regime with real substance, short of an owner and short of disclosed findings on uneven output, which is B. What is published is a quantitative pre-release evaluation framework for the vendor's own classifier: an accuracy metric defined and defended, an adversarial benchmark suite, per-category metric reporting implemented in a purpose-built workbench, model-size threshold findings, and an explicit account of precision and recall trade-offs between models described as more conservative and more creative. That is more evaluation detail than any other record in this lane publishes about its own models. What is absent is the governance structure the A band asks for: no accountable owner inside the vendor is named, no AI policy, model card, governance committee or review board is published, and no finding is disclosed about uneven output across populations or data subject groups, as distinct from across data categories. Worth recording because of where this record sits: this lane's standing finding is that vendors selling AI governance publish least about their own, and this vendor is the counter-example on testing while still publishing no governance structure. Verified 12 September 2026.

No governance position for the vendor's own AI was located, for a product whose agent drafts data protection impact assessments. Nothing published names who inside Privado is accountable for Wren's behaviour, describes what is evaluated before it ships or changes, reports any result from such evaluation, discloses whether its output is uneven across regimes, languages or document types, or offers a model card or system card. The two things that come closest are neither: the statement that customer data and code are never used to train machine learning models is a commitment and is credited on the training signal instead, and the SOC 2 programme with continuous control monitoring is security assurance rather than AI governance. The gap is worth stating precisely because of what the agent does: an assessment Wren populates becomes the customer's record of its own compliance reasoning, shown to regulators and auditors, and the buyer has no published basis on which to judge how that reasoning is produced or checked. The unread data processing addendum and the product documentation site are the rebuttal routes. Wren page, pricing FAQ, security page and subscription terms checked 7 September 2026.

All five A limbs are published, contractual and specific enough to hold the vendor to. Retention: processing is bounded to the term of the Agreement, in-product controls let the customer retrieve, correct, delete or restrict Personal Data, and the Audit Data licence that survives is defined as three enumerated fields rather than left open. Deletion: DPA section 3(f) commits to deleting or returning all Personal Data within 90 days of termination, with the backup carve-out named and those copies required to be isolated, protected from further processing and deleted under stated practices. Access control: Annex 2 documents it control by control, covering authentication, an authorisation model validating user permissions against the attributes of each data set, API access by key or OAuth, VPC and firewall segmentation, intrusion detection, static code analysis, annual third-party penetration testing, a responsible disclosure programme, least-privilege employee access reviewed quarterly and third-party background checks. Subprocessors: named in Annex 1.H with purpose and location, being Amazon Web Services for cloud infrastructure in Virginia and Twilio SendGrid for transactional email, with contractual notification of additions or removals and a 30-day objection right for European and Colorado data. Incident practice: notification without undue delay after becoming aware, with timely information and assistance for the customer's own notification duties. Theta Lake was held at B one build ago on the single limb of a subprocessor list the fetcher could not read; that limb is satisfied here, and the A follows from the same reasoning applied consistently. Agreement dates 10 February 2023 and 17 October 2024 go to the confidence rather than the grade, there being no recency floor. Verified 12 September 2026.

Retention, deletion, access control, subprocessors and incident practice are all published and specific, once the data processing addendum is read alongside the security page. The addendum's Annex II sets out the measures: background checks on all new employees, annual security training, written agreements with every vendor carrying confidentiality, privacy and security obligations, role-based access control, a stated password policy with credentials held in AWS Cognito, a formal change management process with review before production deployment, TLS in transit and strong encryption at rest, vulnerability assessment and penetration testing twice a year, and backups taken every fifteen minutes to a private S3 bucket encrypted with AES-256 and restore-tested twice a year. Retention has periods rather than gestures: personal data is deleted once a user is deleted by an administrator and within six months if the customer leaves, and clause 12 requires return or deletion of all personal data within at least thirty days of the end of the agreement with copies deleted as soon as practicable. Incident practice is defined at clause 11, with maintained breach procedures, notification without undue delay unless the breach is unlikely to risk rights and freedoms, and assistance to notify the authority and data subjects; the incorporated Standard Contractual Clauses add the content a notification must carry. Subprocessors are published individually in Annex II with purpose, data centre locations and which products each supports. The security page's own age is recorded on the certifications row and does not move this grade. Data processing addendum of 7 April 2023, security page and subscription terms read 7 September 2026.

A real published position, specific on the numbers, and it stops where R117 settled this shape one build ago. MSA section 8.1 gives a defence and indemnity against third-party claims that the Service infringes a US patent, trademark, copyright or trade secret, with six named Excluded Activities and an express sole-and-exclusive-remedy statement. Section 11 caps liability unusually precisely: 150% of the fees paid in the twelve months before the act or omission for each party generally, and 300% of those fees for the section 8.1 indemnity, with carve-outs for gross negligence, wilful misconduct, payment obligations and the customer's own indemnity. Section 10.2 gives a limited warranty that the Service conforms in material respects to the Documentation, with a defined path of notice, correction and a right to terminate if it cannot be corrected, which is a warranty a buyer can actually invoke. What keeps this off A is the same thing as on the previous build: no indemnity reaches wrong output, section 10.3 disclaims all warranty as to the Service and any reports or outputs and expressly disclaims that use will produce compliance with law, and no insurance is named anywhere. Verified 12 September 2026.

The fullest published liability position in this lane, and the only one in the pull carrying an insurance schedule. The indemnity at section 12 is broader than the usual intellectual property clause: it covers third-party claims arising from Privado's breach of applicable law, from infringement or misappropriation by the software or by the customer's lawful use of it, and from Privado's own breach of confidentiality, with three named exclusions and the modify, procure or terminate-with-refund ladder. The cap at section 13 is twelve months of subscription fees, and section 13(b) then lifts both the cap and the exclusion of indirect damages for privacy and security breaches, confidentiality breaches, the indemnification obligations and death or personal injury, so the indemnity sits outside the cap rather than inside it. Section 11(f) adds a fixed contractual penalty of twelve months' fees for any confidentiality breach, without releasing Privado from performance and without prejudice to damages. Section 14 requires and maintains commercial general liability at $1,000,000 per occurrence and in aggregate, technology errors and omissions at $1,000,000 per claim, cyber and privacy liability at $1,000,000 per claim and umbrella cover at $1,000,000, with four years of tail on claims-made policies. Warranties at section 5 include material conformance to the documentation and a commitment not to materially decrease functionality. Annexure B commits to 99.9 per cent uptime with service credits graded from 5 to 30 per cent, and support response and resolution goals with a named escalation path. Subscription terms read in full 7 September 2026.

Real, documented integrations into the systems this product's work lives in, short of established depth. Named on the vendor's own surfaces: Snowflake and BigQuery warehouses, AWS infrastructure, identity providers, website cookies, tags and SDKs, third-party applications, and an ingestion path by API, SFTP, manual and web upload. The commercial model itself evidences a connector catalogue, since the MSA prices Connector Integrations as a separate line calculated pro rata. Verifiability is unusually high for this corpus: the Fides core and its connectors are public on GitHub, the API documentation and the release changelog are both published without a login, and Astralis exposes an MCP gateway that policy-checks agent calls. What holds the row at B is that the integrations catalogue and the documentation site were not opened, so what each connector moves and in which direction was not established beyond what the home page and the agreement state. R15 applies to the legal-stack limb: a data infrastructure product bought by privacy counsel integrates with warehouses and identity systems rather than with a document management system, and no document management or practice management connection was located or is expected. Verified 12 September 2026.

Documented integrations into the systems this work already lives in, with what moves, in which direction, and what the customer must configure, stated per product. Wren connects to Jira, Confluence, Linear and procurement tools to capture activity warranting a privacy review, and pushes automated development tickets back into Jira and Linear. Data maps are built from source code through a source control management integration, from third-party applications including customer data platforms, tag managers, CRM, contract lifecycle management, human resources, marketing, procurement and database tools through API integrations, and from imported documents. The integration with OneTrust is described with its direction stated: the personal data inventory, assessments and risks held in OneTrust are automatically updated with information from Privado. Configuration effort is published per module rather than left to a sales call: the web auditor needs only URLs and the geographies to scan from, the app auditor needs the app store URL or the APK and IPA files, neither requires implementation, Wren takes a few days to connect internal tools, set up playbooks and import documents, and the full platform typically takes one to three weeks. What is not established from the pages read is per-connector documentation, which lives on the documentation site and was not opened. Pricing FAQ and Wren page read 7 September 2026.

Deployment model stated clearly with partial residency detail, which is the B band. Two delivery paths are published: the open-source Fides core, which a customer can run in its own infrastructure from the public repository, and Hosted Fides, the subscription service. Tenancy is stated for the hosted path, and stated against the customer's interest rather than for it: DPA Annex 2 records that Customer Data is held in multi-tenant storage systems reachable only through application interfaces and APIs, with no direct customer access to the underlying infrastructure. Residency is partly published: the subprocessor annex places cloud infrastructure with Amazon Web Services in Virginia, United States, and DPA section 6 states that Personal Data will be transferred to and processed by Ethyca, Inc. in the United States and in other jurisdictions where its affiliates and subprocessors operate, with the EU controller-to-processor Standard Contractual Clauses as the transfer mechanism. What is not published is a list of available regions, any choice of region, what changes between the four commercial tiers, or where processing happens as distinct from where data is stored. Verified 12 September 2026.

The regions are stated and the deployment model is not. The data processing addendum's subprocessor annex gives a data centre location for each entry, and the two that hold customer material are specific: Amazon Web Services, described as the primary cloud infrastructure where all Privado applications are hosted and where all data stored, processed and transmitted through the products resides, is listed for the United States, the European Economic Area and India, and MongoDB, the primary product database, for the same three. So a buyer can establish the countries in which its data may sit, which lifts this off the floor. Transfers out of the EEA run on the 2021 Standard Contractual Clauses set out in full in Schedule 1, governed by Irish law with the Irish Data Protection Commission as competent supervisory authority and onward transfers restricted by clause 8.8. What is absent is everything on the deployment side: no tenancy model, no single-tenant or self-hosted option, no statement that a customer can choose or pin a region, and nothing addressing where processing happens as distinct from where data is stored beyond the transfer mechanism. One adjacent fact is recorded so it is not mistaken for residency: the web and app auditors let a customer choose the geography a scan runs from, which is where the simulated user appears, not where data is held. Data processing addendum, security page and subscription terms read 7 September 2026.

The grade records an unusual state and the note has to carry it, because neither adjacent band reads cleanly, which is the band gap logged open at R16. No unsupported badge appears on any surface read: the site footer carries no certification marks at all. The only named standards are SOC 2 Type II and ISO 27001, and the DPA attributes both to Ethyca's data centre partners who maintain independently validated security programmes, not to Ethyca: under R16 that is the hosting provider's scope and does not credit to this product, and there is no scope connector naming the Service. Ethyca's own published assurance is real but is assessment rather than attestation: annual penetration testing by industry-recognised third parties, with a summary report supplied on a confidential basis on request, plus a responsible disclosure programme and static code analysis, all set out in DPA Annex 2. A trust centre exists at trust.ethyca.com, is reachable without a sales call, and states that audit reports and security policies are available on it. Its body is Vanta-hosted and returned page metadata with no readable content to this index's fetcher on 12 September 2026, and an R8 step 4 search did not recover it. That is a limit on the reader and not a finding about the vendor, and if the trust centre names an attestation of Ethyca's own the row is regraded and redated under the corrections backstop. One drafting discrepancy to record: the DPA's Virginia and Colorado section reads ISO 29001 where its European section reads ISO 27001. Verified 12 September 2026.

A badge and a monitoring tool, with no scope, no date and no report route. The footer and the security page carry a SOC 2 mark with the AICPA logo, and the security page states that Privado uses Drata's automation platform to monitor more than one hundred internal security controls continuously with automated alerts and evidence collection. What is absent is everything that would let a buyer check it: no type is stated, so Type I and Type II are not distinguished; no trust services criteria are named; no auditor, examination period or report date appears; and no route to a report, a questionnaire response or a gated portal was located, since there is no trust centre. Continuous control monitoring is a real practice and is credited as substance, but it evidences a programme rather than an attestation. The date on the page matters to the confidence rather than the grade and is recorded here: the security page states it was last updated on 17 February 2022. Security page and site footer read 7 September 2026.

Partly disclosed, which is B, and the disclosure is in an engineering post rather than on a product surface. The models are named, which R34 requires for the top band and which almost nothing in this corpus does: the classifier was built and benchmarked against Qwen's QwQ-32B and DeepSeek-V3 among state-of-the-art models tested, with a published finding that accuracy stops improving above roughly 32B parameters and that models below 18B produce uncorrectable errors. The architecture is described in detail: one request per field to defeat skipped fields, chain-of-thought discussion of tagging considerations, prompt caching, prompt optimisation rather than fine-tuning, and metadata-only inputs. What is absent for A: no provider of inference is identified, the post referring only to cloud inference platforms, and no commitment to notify customers when any of the model supply chain changes is published. Note the gap between two of the vendor's own documents, which is recorded rather than resolved: the contractual subprocessor list names only AWS and Twilio SendGrid, so no model or inference provider appears on the list a customer would be notified about. Post dated 23 December 2025. Verified 12 September 2026.

The vendor sells a named AI agent, publishes a subprocessor list, and no model provider appears on it. This is the sharpest version of this gap in the pull, because the absence is visible rather than inferred. Annex II of the published data processing addendum lists five subprocessors with purpose, data centre locations and the products each supports: Amazon Web Services for infrastructure, MongoDB as the primary product database, SendGrid for transactional email, Intercom for customer support and Amplitude for product analytics. None of them is a model provider, and no model, model family, provider, hosting arrangement or inference location for Wren is named on any surface read. Wren demonstrably runs on a model, since the vendor's own pricing FAQ states that customer data and code are never used to train AI or ML models, so either an unlisted third party sees the documentation, contracts, interview transcripts and source code Wren reads, or the models run inside the AWS footprint already listed, and nothing published tells a buyer which. No commitment is given to notify customers when the arrangement changes, and the subprocessor mechanism at clause 10 gives an objection route without an advance notice period, though the incorporated Standard Contractual Clauses require thirty days' notice of changes to the agreed list for EEA transfers. Data processing addendum, Wren page, pricing FAQ and security page read 7 September 2026.

The shape is visible and the number is not, which is C. The site publishes no pricing page and no figure: every call to action is a demo request, a free-trial request or a contact form. The structure, unusually, is published in the agreement rather than in marketing. MSA section 6.1 names four commercial tiers, Fides True, Fides Team, Fides Plus and Fides Enterprise, and states that Connector Integrations are charged as a separate line and that moving between tiers or adding connectors is calculated pro rata for the duration of use. Section 6.2 states monthly invoicing in advance on 30-day terms with fees non-refundable except on Ethyca's breach, and section 6.3 limits price increases to renewal terms on at least 60 days' notice and requires any increase to be applied generally rather than to one customer. The open-source core is separately free to self-host, which is described in the note rather than as a price. No rate, no band and no implementation figure appears anywhere located, which is what holds the row off B. A pricing row is owed under R17 because this evidence lifts the axis above D, and is written with no figure. Verified 12 September 2026.

A published rate card with figures, units, minimums and what changes between products, which no other record in this lane offers. The pricing page states that the web auditor starts at $600 per website per month billed annually with a four-website minimum and bulk page-based pricing available; the app auditor at $800 per app per month billed annually, with iOS and Android versions counted as two apps; and Wren at $4,200 per month billed annually for up to 500 assessments. Only the full privacy management platform is on request, and the page states what it adds. Each tier lists its included features, so a buyer can see what the money buys before speaking to anyone, and volume discounts are disclosed rather than implied. Annexure A of the subscription terms then defines the units precisely: a developer is a user who has committed to a scanned repository in the last ninety days, a website is each unique URL entered, an app is each platform version, a scan is one execution against one website from one geography, so running the same site from three geographies is three scans. The agreement adds fees in advance, a twelve-month initial term, non-refundable fees and 1.5 per cent monthly interest on late payment. A VendorPricing row is written, with the floor recorded as a figure. Pricing page and subscription terms read 7 September 2026.

Coverage is described with substance and the boundaries are left open, which is B. Who this serves is evidenced by named customers labelled by industry on the vendor's own customers page: publishing (The New York Times, Axios, American City Business Journals), internet software (WeTransfer, SurveyMonkey, Vercel, Podium), fintech (Ramp), retail and consumer brands (Lush, Casper, Away, Parachute, Zola), and marketplace and services businesses (JustPark, Slice, Snackpass). Scale is stated as enterprise, with a separate enterprise page and a statement that the company works as a technical partner rather than selling an out-of-the-box SaaS tool. The buying functions are evidenced by the workflows rather than by a roles page: the current site has no roles or buyer-segment tier at all, which is itself the reason route A was not relied on at the membership screen. What is not stated is where coverage stops: no jurisdictional limit, no statement of which regimes are not supported, and no statement of who the product is not for. R15 applies to the firm-segment and practice-area limbs, which do not bite on a data infrastructure product bought by an in-house privacy and legal function rather than by a practice group. Verified 12 September 2026.

Coverage is described with substance across buyers, regimes and surfaces, and the boundaries are left open. The buyers are addressed by function and evidenced by the customer voices: privacy leaders and privacy teams for assessments and records of processing, engineering for code scanning, and security leadership, with the three named deployments spanning a technology manufacturer, a mapping and location company and a digital health provider. Regulatory coverage is named rather than gestured at, with CCPA, CIPA and GDPR called out, more than fifty pre-built compliance checks, dedicated GDPR and CCPA solution pages, and consent framework handling for GPP, TCF and TAG. The processing surfaces covered are enumerated: websites, mobile apps, internally developed software, third-party SaaS applications and business processes. What is not stated is any limit. No jurisdiction, sector or organisation size is named as out of scope, no coverage boundary is given for the compliance checks, and nothing describes what a law firm rather than an in-house privacy function would do with the platform, which for an index of legal buyers is the boundary that matters. Pricing page, Wren page and solution navigation read 7 September 2026.